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Abstract
In 2013 the Health Research Council of New Zealand began a stream of funding
titled ‘Explorer Grants’, and in 2017 changes were introduced to the funding
mechanisms of the Volkswagen Foundation ‘Experiment!’ and the New Zealand
Science for Technological Innovation challenge ‘Seed Projects’. All three funding
streams aim at encouraging novel scientific ideas, and all now employ random
selection by lottery as part of the grant selection process. The idea of funding
science by lottery has emerged independently in several corners of academia,
including in philosophy of science. This paper reviews the conceptual and
institutional landscape in which this policy proposal emerged, how different
academic fields presented and supported arguments for the proposal, and how
these have been reflected (or not) in actual policy. The paper presents an
analytical synthesis of the arguments presented to date, notes how they support
each other and shape policy recommendations in various ways, and where
competing arguments highlight need for further analysis or more data. In
addition, it provides lessons for how philosophers of science can engage in
shaping science policy, and in particular highlights the importance of mixing
complementary expertise: it takes a (conceptually diverse) village to raise (good)
policy.
1. Introduction
As many of the other papers in this collected volume argue, scientific nov-
elty, even in its more extreme “maverick” variety, is an important collective
epistemic good. As such, we should spend time thinking about the processes
and institutions that encourage or discourage it, and support policies that, all
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else being equal, increase scientific novelty.1 One cluster of institutions that
affect scientific novelty is science funding: if novel projects are not funded, or
if scientists do not apply to work on novel projects, the overall novelty of the
scientific community decreases. Criticisms that the current dominant funding
method, grant peer review, has an adverse effect on scientific novelty are not
new. What is newer is the emergence of academic arguments that support
alternative funding mechanisms, specifically with the aim of increasing scientific
novelty, though these have also been around for a couple of decades. Newer still
are implementations of these alternative mechanisms as actual funding policies
around the world.
This paper looks at one such mechanism, the introduction of random selection
into the funding process of research projects. §2 outlines the institutional
landscape of science funding, and highlights the significance of the emergence
of alternatives to the dominant mechanism of grant peer review. §3 recaps the
arguments that have been put forward in the academic literature in support of
random allocation as an alternative to grant peer review. §4 presents an analytic
synthesis of these various arguments, and shows where they diverge in their
assumptions and where evidence is scarce. §5 surveys policy implementations of
science funding that formally include a random selection element. §6 compares the
surveyed policies against each other and against the policy-relevant characteristics
of the arguments in the literature. §7 makes a brief note of the chain of
publications, evidenced in the citation record, from some of the arguments in the
literature to implemented policy. The aim of the paper is to make two arguments:
the first, that there is a coherent justification for encouraging scientific novelty
1As a reviewer has keenly pointed out, this is left ambiguous with regards to the optimal
level of novelty: is novelty an unalloyed good? From a Bayesian perspective, that seems indeed
to be the case: given two statements with the same a posteriori credence, the one with lower a
priori credence is the more valuable one, as it brings us closer to an accurate model. However,
society does not care just about the value of information: there is a cost to be paid for changing
one’s beliefs and actions (even when the change is for the better), and there is a cost to be
paid for entertaining, even in passing, low-credence ideas; see, e.g, Polanyi [45] on the.tradeoff
between novelty and ex ante plausibility, two key components of scientific merit. The current
paper therefore commits to the weaker claim, that there is value to be gained from increasing
the level of novelty in contemporary scientific practice.
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by introducing formal randomness into research funding mechanisms, though
much uncertainty remains regarding specific policy details; the second, that
the arguments that policy have so far picked up on have taken place outside
philosophy of science, and that now is an opportune moment for philosophers of
science to join this interdisciplinary debate.
2. Context of science funding policy
2.1. The landscape of science funding
Investment in Research and Development (R&D) is a substantial global
phenomenon. In developed countries, such as the United States of America
(USA), Japan, South Korea, and the western member countries of the European
Union (EU), spending on R&D is often in the range of 2-3% of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP).2 This number takes into account both public (government)
spending and private (industry) spending. When taking the significant GDPs of
these countries into account, we arrive at a global R&D investment of roughly
$1.7 trillion.3
Spending on R&D is not homogeneous: it can be divided by source of funding,
and by type of research. While boundaries between divisions may be blurry,
certain distinct categories of R&D funding emerge. The rationale for funding
in each category, and the philosophical analysis of desiderata and appropriate
mechanisms, may differ between these categories.
The first important distinction to be made within R&D spending is between
the sources of funds: public funds, generally originating from tax collection and
allocated by the government, and private funds, generated mainly from corporate
profit or charitable donations, and expended by for-profit or not-for-profit private
organisations. In USA R&D expenditure, the private sector (including charities
and universities’ own funds) accounts for just under three quarters of total R&D
spending, with the dominant private provider by far being industry (65.2% of
2All statistics in this section are from NSB [40], for fiscal year 2013, in 2016 PPP US dollars.
3Total national R&D expenditure: US$456.1 billion (largest), China $336.5 billion (second
largest); All EU nations combined $342.4 billion.
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USA R&D), whereas the public sector (federal and local government) funds just
over a quarter of USA R&D.
A second distinction within R&D expenditure is the kind of research or
development work taking place. While assignment of individual projects into
any category can prove challenging, most within the R&D policy world recognise
categories that are similar to the three characters of work defined by the USA
National Science Foundation (NSF):
Basic Research Research that seeks to gain more complete knowl-
edge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena
and of observable facts, without specific applications toward
processes or products in mind.
Applied Research Research aimed at knowledge necessary for de-
termining the means by which a recognised need may be met.
Development The systematic use of the knowledge or understand-
ing gained from research, directed toward the production of
useful materials, devices, systems, or methods, including design
and development of prototypes and processes.
[34, pp. 4-5, changed styling for clarity]
Somewhat cutting across these categories is the more recently introduced
category of “transformative research”, defined by the United States National
Science Board as:
“a range of endeavors which promise extraordinary outcomes, such
as: revolutionizing entire disciplines; creating entirely new fields; or
disrupting accepted theories and perspectives – in other words, those
endeavors which have the potential to change the way we address
challenges in science, engineering, and innovation.” [39]
From the perspective of this special issue, transformative research is rich
in scientific novelty, and has a certain “maverick” character. While applied
research and development projects can have revolutionary effects, from a policy
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perspective transformative research is most closely related to basic research,
in terms of its high-risk high-reward character, its long term time horizon for
impact, and its positive impacts outside of the domain in which it was first
conceived, all factors which make it unappealing for for-profit organisations [2].
While statistics on transformative research are harder to come by, we can refer
to statistics on basic research as a proxy.
Basic research is only a minor component of global R&D. As discussed above,
about two thirds of R&D funds in the USA are provided by private industry.
Almost all of these funds are directed towards technological development in
few high-tech sectors, and very little (7%) is directed towards basic research,
though that amount still makes up 26% of basic research funding. The major
supporter of basic research in the USA is the public, via the federal government,
which provides 47% of basic research funds.4 Universities, colleges and charities
provide 27% of basic research funds, and the rest comes from local government.
The largest single institutions supporting basic research, both in the USA and in
the world, are federally funded agencies, of which two are particularly dominant:
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the NSF.5 Both NIH and NSF
explicitly state they seek and support transformative research, through a range
of funding channels [38, 43].
2.2. Desiderata for a public science funding mechanism
Before proceeding to discuss the merits and shortcomings of different science
funding mechanisms, we should consider the properties of a good funding mech-
anism. The following list of desiderata is adapted from Chubin [10], Cole et al.
[12], Martino [35], and is based on surveys of practicing scientists:6
Effectiveness The mechanism should be effective at identifying high quality
4Note, though, that this amount only makes up 31% of the federal R&D budget, as much
goes into supporting applied R&D in industries that cannot easily be privatised, such as
defence and energy.
5Expenditure on basic research: NIH $14.7 billion, NSF $4.4 billion.
6Chubin’s list of desiderata also includes Responsiveness, Rationality and Reliability, but I
see these as sub-components of effectiveness.
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research. The results of effective allocation would be that high quality
research is supported, leading to scientific progress and new knowledge.
Efficiency All parties involved would prefer, ceteris paribus, for the process
to be as efficient as possible, meaning for it to require as little time and
resources while providing similar levels of effectiveness. This applies both
to the time and resources on the reviewing side (administration, internal
and external reviewers) and the applicants’ side.
Accountability Funders want the allocation process to maintain accountability,
to make sure scientists are spending the funds in ways that would further
scientific research, to make sure they remain within the bounds of the
project outlined in their proposal, that due process is followed in the
allocation process, and that laws and regulations are adhered to, e.g.
regarding treatment of human and animal subjects.
Fairness The allocation mechanism should distribute funds fairly, meaning it
should not unjustifiably discriminate against any individual or group.
2.3. The process of funding by peer review
Both of the leading institutions in funding of global basic research, NIH
and NSF, allocate funding by a scheme of project choice called peer review,
where research proposals originating from practising scientists are reviewed and
ranked by other scientists working in the same or adjacent fields of research
(their “peers”). The following summary of the operation of peer review is based
on consideration of the application and review process at several governmental
science funding agencies, including NIH [36, 37], NSF [41, 42], the Australian
National Health and Medical Research Council [23], and the Austrian Science
Fund [13].
The process of resource allocation for basic research by peer review is the
dominant contemporary form of resource allocation for scientific projects, the
“gold standard” of science funding. Some aspects of the process are strongly
conserved across nations and institutions:
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Investigator freedom Project proposals originate from the investigators, not
dictated by the funding body or a central organising committee. The extent
to which investigators are free to design projects is limited under various
guideline constraints, but there are many opportunities for significant levels
of freedom.
Individual projects As proposals originate from the investigators, they arrive
at the funding body as discrete, compartmentalised funding opportunities.
The funding bodies have the role of choosing among them, but they do
not, to any significant extent, coordinate between different investigators to
form overarching research programmes.
Information provision As proposals originate from the investigators, they
must inform the funding body about the contents and merits of their
proposed projects. This is often done using a detailed written research
plan, accompanied by various supporting documents.
Peer assessment Funding bodies seek the expert opinion of one or more sci-
entists in evaluating the merit of the proposed projects. While there are
guidelines for component categories of evaluation, the decisions are still
significantly subjective, not algorithmic or box-ticking.
Integration of assessments Often assessment is sought from more than one
source, e.g. multiple reviewers or a mix of internal and external review.
The different assessments are always combined in some way to form a
single judgement per proposal, which is then compared to the judgements
of other proposals.
Ranking and cutoff There are never enough resources to fund all projects
proposed. As such, comparisons of integrated assessments are used to
decide which projects will get funded and which will not.
Other aspects of the process exhibit more variability, such as the identities
of reviewers, the method of integrating assessments, and the guidelines for merit
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evaluation. Nonetheless, the practice of science funding by peer review is very
strongly entrenched, as it has been around since World War Two [25, 26, 1].
Given the emphasis of grant peer review on the ability and responsibility of
scientific experts to select research projects for funding, the proposal to select
projects for funding at random seems very odd in contrast.
2.4. Criticisms of grant peer review
Chubin and Hackett [9] present a critical examination of grant peer review,
based on evidence from surveys of practising scientists. Their stated aim is
to overcome the nearly-mythical standing of peer review as a pillar of modern
science, and highlight the fact that very little has been done to subject peer
review to methodical analysis, despite known tensions and probable shortcomings.
This paucity of evidence regarding the effectiveness of peer review persists to
this day, as was reported in a recent comprehensive literature review [27].
The main argument of Chubin and Hackett is that peer review serves a
function for multiple stakeholders, each having slightly different expectations
from the process and its products. These different desiderata are often in tension
with each other, and so the process of peer review often fails to fully satisfy
any of the desiderata, to the chagrin of stakeholders. Chubin and Hackett note,
using survey data, an increase in the concern scientists and other stakeholders
report regarding peer review. However, they note that as total success rates of
applicants in grant peer review declined, because the increase in the scientific
cohort size outpaced growth of allocated funds, pressure increased within the
scientific community, which led to increased scrutiny of the allocation mechanism,
though it was not any feature of peer review per se that caused the increase in
pressure. Nonetheless, the increased attention to peer review brought to the fore
explicit statements about what different parties considered the proper function of
peer review, and what were the perceived shortcomings in fulfilling this function.
In the two decades since Chubin’s surveys such pressures have only increased, as
discussed in the next section, leading to the current experiments with alternative
funding models such as funding by lottery.
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3. Arguments for random allocation
3.1. Greenberg
Greenberg [24] presented the first argument in an academic journal (to my
knowledge) for funding science by lottery. In a short piece in The Lancet,
Greenberg, a science journalist and author of several books on the politics of
science, enumerates many of the common complaints against peer review. These
include time and resource costs, peer-review being close to random anyway, and
lack of evidence supporting the claim that peer-review is a good way to pick
meritorious projects, including some deeper concerns about the possibility of
conducting meaningful studies on the counterfactuals involved. So far, these
have appeared time and again, including in the published literature [12, 35].
However, Greenberg follows the criticism with (what was then) a novel
proposal:
“So, as a first step towards either verifying peer review or moving
on to a better system, the powers that be should slice off some
respectable percentage of the research funds – say, 15-20% over 5
years – and set them aside. These funds would be awarded by lottery
to applicant scientists whose qualifications and projects have been
certified as respectable, ratings easily determined at a small fraction
of the cost of peer review.
Details aside, the basic principle is clear; instead of dodging the fact
that chance plays a big part in awarding money, the system will
sanctify chance as the determining factor. After a few years, let’s
look back and evaluate the science that came out of this system.
If it’s no worse than what we’re getting now, let’s chuck peer review,
and thereby save a lot of needless effort and money.”
Some of the key features in Greenberg’s proposal will keep repeating, so it is
useful to break these down:
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Pilot of random allocation The change to the existing system should start
with a small pilot that will employ a formal random element, and results
will be compared to the results of peer-review.
Randomness of peer review The low reliability of peer review as a measure
of merit means it will not significantly outperform a lottery.7
Efficiency advantage A lottery will be cheaper and faster than existing peer-
review.
Pre-lottery screening Not all scientists and not all projects should be admit-
ted to the lottery. There should be some quality check, though this is
expected to be much less time- and cost-intensive compared to peer-review
of proposals.
The entire piece can be summarised by one of its opening sentences, in
Greenberg’s characteristic style:
“[W]hen it comes to providing research money, there’s got to be
a better way than the cumbersome, snail-paced, expensive, and
unproven peer-review derby long in effect in the USA and elsewhere.
Why not try a lottery among qualified researchers?”
3.2. Brezis
Nearly a decade later, Brezis [8] presented an economic model-based proposal
for introducing a random element into R&D project selection. Brezis focuses
on criticisms of the effectiveness of peer-review due to bias, and especially on
concerns regarding a conservative bias in peer-review. This bias tends to direct
funds to low-risk projects, underfunding highly innovative projects that could
lead to significant progress, but are also more likely to fail (the kind of novel, or
“maverick”, research this issue is focused on).
7Greenberg, and many later authors, tie this low reliability to low success percentages, such
that reviewers are asked to differentiate between the top applicants.
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Brezis presents three quantitative models to explore efficient allocation of
R&D funds. In the first model, all reviewers are the same, and applications can be
clearly delineated into two pools: innovations (gradual improvements on existing
knowledge) and inventions (radically novel technologies). The value of each
project is composed of three components: its distance from existing technologies
(the greater the better), its cleverness, and its degree of inventiveness (which
only inventions have). Reviewers are assumed to be able to correctly assess
distance and cleverness, but are unable to assess inventiveness, such that a flat
(and, on average, too low) inventiveness score is assigned to inventions. Under
such assumptions, reviewers are likely to underscore inventions, resulting in lost
effectiveness. The proposed solution is to separate the inventions from the funding
pool (focalisation), and select from amongst them by lottery (randomisation);
the remaining innovations are ranked and funded as usual. This method, that
relies on expert assessment to select a subsection of proposals to enter into a
lottery, is labelled by Brezis as “focal randomisation”.
In Brezis’ second model, reviewers are no longer assumed to be equal. They
vary in their degree of diligence, such that more diligent reviewers spend more
time on their reviews, and arrive at more accurate assessments of distance. In
the third model reviewers are also allowed to vary in their creativeness, such that
more creative reviewers are better able to assess the inventiveness of proposals.
With this increased and variable ability to assess the value of proposals, Brezis
suggests that the high-value inventions will be occasionally highly ranked, but
only by some (more diligent and creative) reviewers. These will show up in the
ranked list of proposals as mid-ranking with high variability between reviewers,
whereas high quality innovations will be consistently scored highly, and low
quality proposals will be consistently scored low. The information from the
reviewers, both in terms of score averages and in terms of variability, can be
used to transfer those proposals about which reviewers disagree into a lottery,
while also funding the unanimously high-scored top ranking proposals. This
version of focal randomisation does not rely on reviewers’ ability to tell apart in
advance which proposals are innovations and which are inventions, but rather
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leverages the variance in reviewer scores as a proxy for this distinction.
Brezis shows, with worked numerical examples, that focal randomisation
provides better outcomes than the alternative of straightforwardly funding
according to aggregated reviewers’ scores. This result is robust across the
models, and stems from the ability of random selection to pick highly innovative
projects, which is something reviewers (at least in the models) struggle to do.
On top of making a clear policy recommendation, two further features should
be noted about Brezis’ argument:
Bounded reviewer ability Reviewers in Brezis’ models are not able to ascer-
tain the true value of proposed projects. This lack of reliability is further
explored by breaking down both features of proposal merit (cleverness,
distance, inventiveness) and reviewer characteristics (creativity, diligence).
Link between lack of epistemic access and randomisation The reason fo-
cal randomisation is superior to straightforward peer review in Brezis’
models is that reviewers make inaccurate evaluations of proposals’ values,
and these inaccuracies are systemic – some projects, namely inventions,
simultaneously have high intrinsic value and low epistemic access, leading
to a conservative bias. Focal randomisation leverages information that is
available, such as score variability, to identify those regions of low epistemic
access, and directs them to a lottery. This results in higher effectiveness,
in terms of value of projects chosen, compared to peer review.
Consensus precludes randomisation As an extension of the above point,
when reviewers agree that a proposal should be accepted or rejected, this
indicates good epistemic access to the true value of the proposal, and
obviates the need for randomisation.
While she focuses on conservative bias, Brezis concludes that focal randomi-
sation could also help ameliorate further biases, expanding the virtues of random
allocation beyond effectiveness and into fairness:
“It could also be that referees choose projects in which they are not
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completely disinterested. They could act not in the public interest ex-
clusively, but might have self interest, and might, for some subjective
reason, dislike a project. [. . . ] This “public choice” perspective would
strengthen the importance of introducing randomization, into which
no elements of sympathy, approval or power enter. Randomization
on the projects where referees disagree not only increases diversity,
but is a way of avoiding the tendency to accept projects of “club”
insiders.” [8, p. 15]
3.3. Barnett, Graves, Clarke, Herbert and Blakely
Barnett, Graves, Clarke, Herbert and Blakely are public health and biomedical
researchers, who set out to collect up-to-date and reliable evidence on the
shortcomings of grant peer review, mainly its lack of reliability or high randomness
[23] and its low efficiency or high costs [29].
Graves et al. [23] presents the most thorough measurement published to date
of the variability of grant peer review scores.8 The authors used the raw peer
review scores assigned by individual panel members to 2705 grant proposals. All
proposals were submitted to the National Health and Medical Research Council
of Australia (NHMRC) in 2009. The scores were given by reviewers sitting on
panels of seven, nine, or eleven members, and the average score of the panel was
used to decide whether a project was funded or not, based on its rank relative
to other proposals.
The authors used a bootstrap method to generate a counterfactual population
of possible review scores for each proposal, yielding a mean and a variance in
that mean, and a confidence interval around the mean. This confidence interval,
labeled by the authors the “score interval”, was then compared to the funding
cutoff line: proposals whose score interval was consistently above or consistently
below the funding line were considered “efficiently classified” by the review
system, whereas proposals whose score interval straddled the funding line were
8An earlier review paper by Cicchetti [11] covers various measurements with smaller sample
sizes.
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considered as problematic, or “variably/randomly classified”.
The results showed that overall, 61% of proposals were never funded (score
interval was consistently below the funding line), 9% were always funded (score
interval consistently above the funding line), and 29% were sometimes funded
(score interval straddling the funding line).
In the authors’ opinion, the discrepancy between the observed levels of
variability, and the importance of funding decisions to individuals’ careers,
is cause for concern. The authors claim the results show “a high degree of
randomness”, with “relatively poor reliability in scoring” (p. 3). The authors
follow with a list of possible improvements to the peer review system. One of
their suggestions is to investigate the use of a (limited) lottery, similar to Brezis’
focal randomisation:
Another avenue for investigation would be to assess the formal inclu-
sion of randomness. There may be merit in allowing panels to classify
grants into three categories: certain funding, certain rejection, or
funding based on a random draw for proposals that are difficult to
discriminate. [23, p. 4]
In addition to the variability of grant peer review, the group also evaluated
its cost. The cost of the grant peer review system can be broken down into three
components:
1. The cost of writing the applications (both successful and unsuccessful),
incurred by the applicants.
2. The cost of evaluating the proposals and deciding on which application to
fund, incurred by internal and external reviewers.
3. The administrative costs of the process, incurred by the funding body.
According to Graves et al. [23], in the funding exercise discussed above the
largest of these costs was, by far, the cost incurred by the applicants, totalling
85% of the total cost of the exercise (p. 3). The authors used full costing of the
review process and administration budget, but only a small sample of applicant
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reports. To complete their data, a more comprehensive survey was conducted
amongst the researchers who submitted applications to NHMRC in March, 2012.
The results of this survey, discussed below, are reported in Herbert et al. [29].
The authors received responses from 285 scientists who submitted in total
632 proposals. These provide a representative sample of the 3570 proposals sent
to NHMRC in March 2012, and display the same success rate of 21%. Based on
the survey results the authors estimated, with a high degree of confidence, that
550 working years went into writing the proposals for the March 2012 funding
round. When monetised based on the researchers’ salaries, this is equivalent to
14% of the funding budget of NHMRC. New proposals took on average 38 days
to prepare, and resubmissions took on average 28 days. The average length of a
proposal was 80-120 pages.
Using survey data, the authors also tried to detect a correlation between
extra time spent on a proposal and the proposal’s likelihood of being funded.
Surprisingly, no such correlation was found, and given the power of the study
this suggests that, on average, 10 extra days spent on a proposal are likely to at
most increase the likelihood of success by 2.8% (p. 3).
Based on their findings, the authors hypothesise the existence of a curve
which associates the accuracy of the peer review system in evaluating the merit
of a proposal to the amount of information provided by each applicant (Fig. 1).
The hypothetical graph has certain interesting features:
• The graph hypothesises the existence of an “ideal”, which is the amount
of information required for the optimal level of accuracy. In the paper this
level of accuracy appears close to, though not equal to, 100%.
• In the area left of the “ideal”, i.e. where the information provided is less
than the ideal amount, the graph displays diminishing returns, such that
equal increases in information provided result in less increase in accuracy
the more information has already been provided.
• In the area right of the “ideal”, the graph displays an “overshoot” effect,
with accuracy decreasing as information increases. In the text, this is
15
explained as the reviewers being overburdened with too much information.
Figure 1: The accuracy of peer review assessment as a function of information provided.
Reproduced from Herbert et al. [29, Fig. 2, p. 5], published under CC-BY-NC licence:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/legalcode.
The authors rely on their result, that no statistically significant correlation
was found between extra time spent on a proposal and its likelihood of success,
to argue that the current amount of information provided is more than the
ideal. However, one does not follow the other, because increased accuracy does
not imply higher merit for a proposal. Nonetheless, the authors’ description
of reviewers having to read 50-100 proposals of 80-120 pages does suggest an
unnecessary cognitive burden. Based on their hypothetical curve, the authors’
suggestions for reducing the amount of information gathered implies a lower
accuracy for the peer review system. The authors believe this lowered accuracy
is justified, on cost/benefit grounds, even though in their model a high level of
accuracy is possible.
In addition to reinforcing many of Brezis’ key points, the key contribution of
the group can be seen as providing quantifiable measures for bounded reviewer
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ability and the potential efficiency advantage of a lottery. They draw a clear
connection between cost and epistemic access.
3.4. Gillies
Gillies [22] is the first published paper by a philosopher of science to call for
random allocation of research funds. The argument is developed from a critique
of peer review written by Sir James Black, Nobel Laureate and discoverer of two
blockbuster drugs. Black argues that the slowdown in the rate of discovery of
new drugs in the beginning of the 21st century was not due to “the culling of
low-hanging fruit”, but rather due to a failure in the system of peer review, a
system that, according to Black, destroys scientific creativity. The anti-creative
prejudice of peer review, Black and Gillies argue, is believed throughout the
research community, leading researchers with creative ideas to keep silent about
them and instead seek funding for “safer” projects. This effect is labelled by
Black as “undesirable feedback”.
Gillies argues that the failure of peer review in supporting creative research
stems from “researcher narcissism” [22, p. 8]. Under this condition, individual
researchers believe their chosen approach to the topic is the best possible approach.
The first reason that “researcher narcissism” emerges is psychological. Each
individual researcher spends a lot of time choosing their approach, and in the
process of choosing they come up with reasons for justifying their eventual
decision. These reasons are likely to be shared by other researchers surrounding
the individual, as individuals choose a research community that will support
their approach. This echoing of reasons further entrenches the individuals’ belief
in the justification of the superiority of their chosen approach. The second reason
for the emergence of “researcher narcissism” is personal benefit. Individual
researchers will enjoy more successful careers if others, including funding bodies,
awarding bodies, and students, choose to endorse or follow the same approach
as the individual researcher. Conversely, if the field rejects the approach of the
researcher, negative career consequences are likely to follow. This incentive to
have one’s own approach succeed will often lead individuals to believe that it
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will indeed succeed, or at least behave as if this was their belief.
While it is clear that in a heterogeneous research community not all researchers
can be justified in believing their chosen approach is the best one, Gillies goes
further to argue that virtually all researchers are mistaken in their “narcissist”
beliefs. This is “because no one really knows in advance what research projects
are going to succeed. This is because research is, by definition, the exploration
of things, which are as yet unknown” [22, p. 7]. While not explicit in the 2014
piece, this position echoes Gillies’ Kuhnian reading of science, and his numerous
detailed case studies that show researchers under-valuing innovative research
from competing paradigms or research schools, an effect that is amplified by
peer-review [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
As an alternative to grant peer review, Gillies proposes selecting which
researchers to fund using random selection. Proposals will still be generated
by individual researchers, as they are under peer review, to check that they
fall within the field of the grant. In addition, applying individuals will be
evaluated for competence in the field of research suggested, e.g. by checking for
qualifications such as a research PhD, experience as a research assistant in other
projects, or by the applicant’s track record of research and publication. These
checks, Gillies argues, would be relatively straightforward and much cheaper
than peer review, while still addressing the need to filter out “cranks”.9 Once
proposals have been screened, a random selection is performed from amongst
the remaining proposals.
While Gillies considers the likely immediate response to be that random
selection will be less effective than peer review in supporting good research, he
argues that the converse is true, due to the widespread systemic bias resulting
from “researcher narcissism” as described above. Furthermore, it is envisaged
that once peer review is removed applicants will have no reason to opt for “safe”
proposals, and the level of innovation in proposals will increase, thus leading to
9The responsibility of science funding mechanisms to filter out “cranks” has been highlighted
by Polanyi [45], in a seminal paper which also presents a strong defence of grant peer review
against the foil of project selection by government bureaucrats.
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more creative and beneficial research. Gillies proposes that random choice may
first be introduced in a restricted set of institutions, and research can then be
carried out to monitor its performance.
Largely we see Gillies repeating and reinforcing the key points we’ve seen
above, such as pilot of random allocation, efficiency advantage and pre-lottery
screening, as well as a more detailed account of the causes of bounded researcher
ability. Gillies also puts forward a more radical version of lack of epistemic access.
In addition to the above, two important features should be noted about Gillies’
work (especially when taking into account his earlier papers and books):
Detailed historical examples Cases where we are led to believe, despite the
difficulties of counterfactual historical reasoning, that random allocation
would have led to better outcomes than peer review (e.g. zur Hausen,
pharmaceutical R&D), or that peer review would have led to worse out-
comes than whatever system existed at the time (e.g. Frege, Semmelweis,
Wittgenstein).
Systemic effects of peer review Beyond the immediate effect on applicants
in a funding round, Gillies draws out the systemic effect on the balance
between competing research programmes or paradigms, and on the kinds
of proposals individuals consider fundable. Both of these systemic effects
lead to a systemic reduction in diversity and creativity across the research
community.
3.5. Avin
Another philosopher of science who have argued for science funding by lottery
is Avin [3, 4, 5]. Avin, like Brezis, utilises formal models to explore the effect of
different allocation mechanisms on collective generation of epistemic progress.
Unlike Brezis, though, Avin focuses on long-term dynamic effects that emerge as
a society of researchers explores a scientific topic of interest. In that, Avin’s work
can be seen as belonging to the growing literature on formal social epistemology.
Avin [3, 4] presents a modification of the epistemic landscape model of
Weisberg and Muldoon [48]. Adapted from its original context in evolutionary
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biology, Weisberg and Muldoon’s model depicts a population of investigators
exploring a hilly landscape, where different coordinates of the landscape depict
different approaches to the study of a scientific topic of interest; the height at
each coordinate in the landscape corresponds to the significance of the results
that would accrue from pursuing the corresponding approach. The population
of investigators is seeded on the landscape at random, with each agent having
limited information about the landscape – only the significance of immediately
adjacent positions is known. In each simulation turn, the agents follow simple
rules, based on their individual characteristics, in the aim of exploring more of
the landscape and attaining significant results. The performance of the entire
community, rather than of individual agents, is then measured as the individual
characteristics of the agents (the rules they follow) are varied.
In Avin’s model, the characteristics of individual agents remain the same
throughout the simulation. Instead, Avin varies the population itself, through
the funding mechanism in a process akin to selection, as well as the topology of
the landscape, as approaches gain or lose significance in response to investigators’
actions. In Avin’s simulation, investigators need to propose to work on an
approach; every turn all proposals are aggregated, and a subset is selected based
on different selection mechanisms, modelled to represent idealised versions of
funding mechanisms. The selected investigators are placed on the landscape for a
limited period, representing a time-limited grant, and pursue their research; once
the grant period is over, investigators submit their results, and then re-apply
for funding to pursue research on the same, or one of the adjacent, research
approaches. The selection mechanisms modelled include the community’s best
estimate of the merit of the proposal, based on past experience (akin to grant
peer review), a triage of proposals somewhat akin to Brezis’ focal randomisation,
a completely random lottery, and automatic renewal such that no new entrants
are accepted.
In addition to modelling the population makeup as dynamic, Avin also
models the landscape as dynamic. When investigators complete their grants,
three effects are triggered:
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1. The significance of the approach is significantly reduced, to reflect the
one-off nature of discovery.
2. The approach, and all nearby approaches, lose some significance due to
reduced novelty.
3. A new hill is added to the landscape in a random position to indicate new
research avenues.
When the population dynamics and landscape dynamics are taken together,
Avin’s result indicate that funding by lottery can significantly outperform funding
by peer-review.
Avin [5] goes beyond the model, to consider the policy factors that are
required to bridge the model results and actual policy recommendations. Two
factors of particular interest are the cost and fairness of a lottery. On both
aspects, a lottery compares favourably to peer review, as effort required by
applicants is significantly reduced, and bias is eliminated (even if that bias is
unknown). Avin notes, however, that for these benefits to accrue, the lottery’s
entry criteria need to be minimal, which could undermine accountability, and so
a pre-screening solution is proposed that can capture some fairness and efficiency
gains, as well as the effectiveness gains indicated by the model, while maintaining
a high degree of accountability. Avin concludes with a list of certain domains
where, according to the model or other policy considerations, a lottery should
not be applied, for example in applied research with an urgent deadline, in very
well-established narrow fields where the “terrain” of open questions is throughly
mapped out, and in cases of “Big Science”, where very large sums are awarded
to individual projects employing hundreds or thousands of researchers.
3.6. Fang and Casadevall
Fang and Casadevall [14] is the most recent published paper calling for
funding by lottery, and in some sense the most ambitious, as it calls for the
introduction of random allocation at the NIH, the world’s largest funder of basic
research. Fang and Casadevall are biomedical researchers, and their proposal
is partly based on their previous research [15] that showed reviewers’ scores
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of the top 20% of applications are a very weak predictor of grant productivity
(in terms of numbers of publications and citations). The focus on the top 20%
matters, as Fang and Casadevall argue that peer review is no longer effective,
due to falling success rates. They accept that reviewers are able to broadly
distinguish between meritorious and non-meritorious proposals, but reject (with
the evidence above) reviewers’ ability to make fine grained distinctions amongst
the meritorious.10Note that contra Brezis, Fang and Casadevall thus argue that
the greatest uncertainty is near the top of the pile, not in its middle.
Beyond low reliability in distinguishing amongst meritorious projects, Fang
and Casadevall list all the objections to peer review that we are by now familiar
with: conservatism, bias (they note specifically concerns about gender and
race bias), and large time investments. Of these, they consider bias to be the
main reason to shift to a lottery, once the lack of reliability of peer review is
acknowledged:
“Although the proposed system could bring some cost savings, we
emphasize that the primary advantage of a modified lottery would
be to make the system fairer by eliminating sources of bias. The
proposed system should improve research workforce diversity, as
any female or underrepresented minority applicant who submits a
meritorious application will have an equal chance of being awarded
funding.” [14, p. 5]
Fang and Casadevall provide extensive details about their proposed lottery
system. In addition to pre-lottery screening, they propose:
Automatic re-entrance to future lotteries This would apply to those pro-
posals that have been deemed meritorious in the pre-screening, but failed
to win the lottery. This has two claimed advantages: it frees up the time
of applicants who would otherwise be writing new proposals every year,
10A recent study, that replicated the NIH funding process, further supports the claim that
reviewers do not agree amongst themselves on the relative merit of high-quality proposals, and
therefore calls for a consideration of a modified lottery proposal [44].
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and it allows institution administrators to plan ahead given the number of
proposals from their institution that are waiting for their lucky turn.
Limit to one proposal per applicant This is to avoid abuse of the system,
and to give all researchers who have produced meritorious proposals equal
chances.
Detailed feedback only for rejected applications This is to allow authors
of failed applications to revise and resubmit in future pre-screening rounds.
Separate lottery for newcomers This is to guarantee a good representation
amongst the funding portfolio for new entrants, increasing diversity.
Funders can hand-pick winners Programme officers (who manage NIH fund-
ing) could use various payment mechanisms at their disposal to provide
funds for researchers who end up particularly unlucky, or if a field is at
risk of drying up due to a series of unsuccessful draws.
Fang and Casadevall conclude with ten benefits of funding by their modified
lottery over current NIH practices. Most of these are familiar from the above
works, but the last is worth mentioning: as the lottery will make visible the
number of meritorious projects who are going unfunded from year to year, it will
help signal the amount of untapped research potential to funders, politicians,
and the public, and may help garner more resources for research.
4. Analytic synthesis
We have seen several arguments put forward to support science funding
by random allocation. These have emerged from diverse corners of academia,
and utilise a wide range of tools to support the arguments: closed-form models
(Brezis), novel data collection (Barnett et al), historical examples (Gillies), agent-
based simulations (Avin), and surveys of empirical findings (Fang and Casadevall).
Here I aim to put together a single coherent synthesis that explains the basic
thrust of the argument supporting the policy, as well as points of disagreement
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that explain the variations we see between different implementations of this
policy (and further variations we may see in the future).
P1. Selection by peer evaluation is the natural policy ‘foil’, as it is the dominant
form of funding.
P2. Peer evaluation is used to provide a reliable and accountable measurement
of proposal merit, such that public funds could be spent on the best science.
P3. The cost of peer evaluation is composed of the cost of preparing proposals,
of reviewing them, and of administering the process. Of these, proposal
preparation is the largest cost. The costs increase as the level of detail
asked for in the proposals increases.
P4. Qua measurement, at least in some domains, peer review is subject to
random errors, or at least does not offer a good cost-benefit tradeoff at the
level of accuracy sought:
P4a. General argument from cluelessness: research is inherently about
venturing into the unknown, precluding any ability to evaluate project
merit ex ante.
P4b. Specific argument from cluelessness: most research is incremental and
can therefore can be reliably evaluated ex ante, but some research
projects are highly innovative, which precludes an accurate evaluation
of their merit. However, these are some of the most valuable research
projects. Reviewer disagreement may be an indicator that a proposal
is highly innovative.
P4c. Lack-of-accuracy argument: like all measurements, peer review is
subject to random errors, which limit its ability to make fine-grained
distinctions between proposals even if coarse grained distinctions are
possible, e.g. between meritorious and non-meritorious projects.
P4d. Cost addendum to lack-of-accuracy argument: like most measurement
procedures, there are diminishing returns to accuracy from information
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provided, such that much more information is required from applicants
to make fine grained distinctions than is required for coarse grained
distinctions.
P5. A main putative shortcoming of funding by lottery is its lack of reliability,
but if it comes close to or matches the reliability of peer review in some
domains, than other features of the lottery will make it a more favourable
selection mechanism.
P6. In addition to random errors, peer review, at least in some domains, is
also subject to systemic errors, or biases. These affect both reliability and
fairness:
P6a. Researcher narcissism: all reviewers are biased with regards to their
own research agenda and competing research agendas. These biases
compound when a field is composed of competing schools of thought,
or when an existing paradigm is challenged by a new one.
P6b. On top of (P4b), which indicates lack of accuracy when evaluating
radically novel proposals, there may also be bias against novel research,
as part of or in addition to (P6a).
P6c. Apart from bias for/against ideas and projects, there can be biases
for/against individuals, individual characteristics (such as race and
gender), institutions and network membership.
P7. With regards to bias for/against ideas, applicants are incentivised to learn
and adapt to these biases, creating a feedback loop.
P8. A lottery is an inherently unbiased selection mechanism.
P9. A selection mechanism needs to maintain accountability. Specifically,
awarding grants to proposals that are considered, by consensus, to be low
quality should be avoided (though this may clash with P4a and P6a).
P10. There is currently only little, and somewhat controversial, data on the
accuracy and bias of peer review. Such data is hard to come by.
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P11. There is currently very little data on how funding by lottery works/will
work in practice.
C1. In areas where the reliability of peer review is low (defined by which of
P4 and P6 sub-premises one accepts), a lottery should be trialled as an
alternative funding mechanism with potentially better effectiveness and
efficiency.
C2. Unless one is very concerned about P4a and/or P6a, proposals and/or ap-
plicants should be pre-screened to maintain (coarse-grained) accountability
while still reducing costs and (some) bias.
C3. At present, funding lotteries should be run as trial policies with a small
subset of all available funds, and outcomes should be compared to the
outcomes of funding by peer review.
Versions of the argument above play out in the justification for the funding-
by-lottery policies surveyed in §5. We should, however, also notice the absence of
certain arguments, to do with power and control, which I will only sketch here.
4.1. Control of funding
There is an ongoing debate over who should control scientific research, the
state or the scientific community [7, 45, 25, 26].11 The main argument for
control by the scientific community over state funds (albeit with appropriate
oversight and accountability mechanisms) is that the scientific community is best
positioned to judge which research avenues or most promising, which researchers
are most competent, which proposals most plausible and meritorious. Radical
scepticism about this ability, as suggested by some who support funding by
lottery, threatens the status quo, and a shift of power to the state.
In particular, it is important to differentiate two readings of the lottery
proposal. On a per-project reading, the lottery implies that any project is as
11In recent decades attention has largely shifted to questions of corporate control, but for
basic research the main locus of funding, and therefore debate over control, is at the state
level.
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good as any other – in which case state officials, or other interested parties, may
argue for picking their favourites. On the social level, however, such exercise of
control would be precisely antithetical to the aims of the lottery, which is to
eliminate bias – it is the distribution generated by the lottery, rather than the
individual projects chosen, that makes the lottery favourable. If, however, it
would be difficult to defend this distinction and sustain the lottery in the long
run from interventions by interested parties, then the lottery proposal may well
end up backfiring.
4.2. Personal benefits from reviewing proposals
We often talk about the cost for reviewers, in terms of time wasted in reading
tall stacks of proposals and endless meetings with bad coffee. However, the
researchers who sit on reviewing panels, often quite senior and accomplished in
their field, also gain certain benefits from the process. Gillies [22] hints at one of
these: as long as the scientific community is divided over the best framework,
theory or approach in a certain domain (which is often the case), reviewers get
to exercise some power over the battle, towards the position they most strongly
identify with. This, in fact, is expected of them, as it is part of the exercise
of their expertise. On a more humdrum level, the slow process of scientific
publication means that reviewers gain privileged access to scientific progress and
plans made by their peers.
As one reviewer notes, the loss of such benefits to proposal reviewers is in
no way part of the normative criticism of the lottery proposal; rather, it is a
factor that may explain why some actors might be less willing to implement such
proposals. Since there is a high degree of overlap between the senior scientists
who sit on grant review panels, and the scientific advisors who are likely to
consult on matters of science policy, including on the overall mechanism of
science funding, there may be personal incentives to support the status quo and
reject proposals that would diminish reviewers’ benefits. Note, however, that
most policy proposals of funding by lottery involve pre-screening by experts,
such that reviewers retain at least some of the benefits discussed.
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5. Current examples of random allocation of research funds
The above summarises the arguments in the literature for formally introducing
a random selection element into science funding. As mentioned in the framing
of the paper, however, this is no longer an ex cathedra exercise: there are now at
least three science funders who employ random selection as part of their funding
mechanisms, surveyed below.12
5.1. New Zealand Health Research Council – Explorer Grants
In 2013, the New Zealand Health Research Council (HRC) launched a new
funding stream, titled ‘Explorer Grants’, to promote transformative research
HRC [31]. Explorer Grants are available in any health research discipline and
are worth NZ$150,000 for a term of up to 24 months. Applicants are required
to provide a brief project proposal (circa 10 pages for the entire application
in 2017). The proposals are anonymised and presented to a panel for initial
evaluation of transformative potential and viability. Applications that pass the
initial screening are submitted to a lottery, and the lottery winners are funded.
Unlucky proposals which fail to win the lottery can be resubmitted in subsequent
rounds.
These are the numbers of applicants and grants awarded to date:
Year # Applications # Awards
2013 116 3
2014 24 4
2015 45 4
2016 38 9
2017 34 11
12The Foundational Questions Institute (FQXi) used to run a mini-grants program via
lottery, which received a mention as the only such policy at the time in a policy review of
alternatives to grant peer review [28]. These grants are of a much smaller scale then the funding
streams surveyed below, and at the time of writing were not accepting new applications, and
so are not included in this survey.
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From the above, there have been 31 grants awarded to date (all involving
random selection), for a total amount of NZ$4.65M (US$3.25M in current
exchange rates).
5.2. Volkswagen Foundation – Experiment!
The Volkswagen Foundation (VolkswagenStiftung) is the largest private
research funding foundation in Germany, with an annual funding volume of
around 150 million euros. It has been running the ‘Experiment!’ funding stream
since 2012, with the objective of:
“an exploration of fundamentally new research topics disregarding
a high project risk and the vagueness of a successful outcome. The
funding is meant for an exploratory phase, which is limited with
respect to duration and finance, in order to demonstrate preliminary
evidence for the concept’s potential. In case of disappointment the
scientific explanation of obstacles is a desired result.” [47]
Grants are awarded for up to EUR 120,000 and 1.5 years, and cover “exper-
iments and theory in science, engineering, behavioral and life sciences”. The
2017-2020 funding rounds are expected to award 30-40 grants per year, doubling
the amount from the 2013-2016 period. The first years of the program saw
around 500 applications per year.
Applicants are required to submit brief proposals (circa 5 pages). An initial
screening takes place by Foundation staff to guarantee proposals meet the
program criteria; this stage filters down from 500 applications to 120-140
proposals. In a second stage, the applications that passed the initial screening are
presented to an international and interdisciplinary jury, which selects the 15-20
most promising applications (akin to peer review, though no written evaluations
are produced); during this process, each jury member is given a single ‘funding
joker’ which they can use to propose consideration of an application that does
not reach consensus.
In the 2017-2020 rounds, a second mechanism will be introduced in the second
selection stage, whereby in addition to the 15-20 proposals selected by the jury,
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an additional 15-20 proposals will be selected at random from the qualifying
proposals. Applicants will not know whether their proposals have been selected
by the jury or have been lucky in the lottery. The lottery selection is considered
to be in ‘trial phase’, and will be re-evaluated in 2020.
Given the details above, it is estimated that during 2017-2020 there will be
70 proposals selected by lottery, for a value of up to EUR 8.4M (US$9.9M in
current exchange rates).
5.3. New Zealand Science for Technological Innovation challenge – Seed Projects
The Science for Technological Innovation challenge (SfTI) is one of New
Zealand’s 11 National Science Challenges. It was launched in 2015 as “a 10-year,
multi-million dollar investment aimed at growing a future high-tech New Zealand
economy”. In 2016 and 2017 SfTI offered funding for “Seed Projects”, which are
“intended to bring new people with fresh ideas into the SfTI Challenge.
They align with the SfTI Challenge Research Themes and involve
high-risk research with potentially high rewards.” [46]
Funded Seed Projects receive up to NZ$100,000 per year, and last for up to
three years (2016 round) or two years (2017 round). A portion of the funding
pool is reserved for Vision Ma¯tauranga, which “aims to unlock the science and
innovation potential of Ma¯ori knowledge, resources and people for the benefit of
all New Zealanders.” In 2016, projects were selected by a panel, in a system akin
to peer review. In 2017, however, the panel only provided initial screening for
matching the eligibility criteria, both of the challenge in general and of Vision
Ma¯tauranga, and were entered into two corresponding ballots. A total of 18
projects were selected from the ballots, out of 79 applications, for a total worth
of NZ$3M (US$2.1M in current exchange rates). There are currently no plans
to fund more Seed Projects as part of the SfTI challenge.
6. Comparison between policies and arguments
How do the policies surveyed above compare to the arguments for funding
by lottery? To what extent do they follow arguments from cluelessness, lack-
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of-accuracy, or cost? How do they deal with fairness and accountability issues?
These are not always explicit, but we can look at policy elements that may
serve as proxies for these concerns. For proxies of accountability, we can see
if institutional affiliation is required, if pre-lottery screening is required, and
whether the funder follows up with awardees to check progress and quality of
outputs. For proxies of concerns regarding effectiveness of selection, we can
look at the kind of proposals accepted (only transformative research?), the
composition of reviewers per proposal (specific peers, broad interdisciplinary
panels, or light touch filtering by the institution’s staff), the extent to which a
random lottery is used, whether reviewer scores affect lottery chances (e.g. as
a wighted lottery or in a focal randomisation process), and whether applicants
that fail the lottery are allowed to resubmit. For proxies of fairness concerns, we
can look at whether proposals are anonymised, and whether fairness is explicitly
mentioned as a benefit of lottery selection. For proxies of efficiency, we can look
at whether proposals are required to be short, and whether detailed plans and
budgets are mandatory.
A comparison of the policies across these characteristics is presented in the
following table:
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Characteristic Explorer Grants Experiment! Seed Projects
Just transformative research Yes Yes Yes
Need institutional affiliation Yes Yes Yes
Pre-lottery screening Yes Yes Yes
Screening done by Experts Staff Experts
Random selection All Half All
Reviews affect lottery No No No
Short proposals Yes Yes Unknown
Detailed budget required No No No
Explicit fairness reasoning No No Yes
Anonymous proposals Yes Yes No
Allow resubmission Yes Unknown Yes
Post-funding monitoring Yes Yes Yes
One clear difference between the implemented policies and the arguments
in the literature is that the policies only apply for a small subset of R&D,
namely transformative research; this contrasts with the arguments which all
see themselves as applying to all R&D, or at least all basic research.13 By
limiting their scope, the implemented policies shy away from directly attacking
the established mechanism of grant peer review, which is something all arguments
in the literature do. Indeed, all implemented lottery mechanisms are operated
by funders who also run other funding streams, where the selection mechanism
13There are also several related philosophical puzzles here: why is it that noticing the lack
of a certain collective property (novelty) in a class of objects (research outputs) does not
lead to new action, but carving out (and officially naming) a sub-class of the original class
(transformative research), that is identified by certain values of that property (high novelty),
does enable such policy change? Can research projects be carved into transformative and
non-transformative in practice? Can they be so separated ex ante? Why is it desirable to
have any non-transformative research? A survey of transformative research, its philosophy,
limits and criticisms, is beyond the scope of this paper. It should be noted, however, that the
way science policy institutions conceptualise science has a direct effect on the policies they
are willing to entertain. It should also be noted that the origin of transformative research as
a science policy category is linked to Kuhn’s picture of science as divided into Normal and
Revolutionary. It shouldn’t be news that ideas from philosophy of science travel far, or that
their criticisms travel much more slowly (if at all). It might be more surprising, at least to
some, that large sums of money depend on such concepts, or that the time it takes for them to
play out is measured in decades.
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for other, non-transformative, funding streams is grant peer review. It may be
that data on the results of these trial policies will be required before traditional
funding stream will consider shifting from grant peer review to random selection
— it is easier to try something new than to change an existing policy.
From the above it is clear that the implemented policies lean more on the side
of Fang and Casadevall, in seeing lotteries as a way to make funding of transfor-
mative research more efficient (shorter proposals) and to remove explicit biases
(anonymised proposals or explicit statement that lotteries contribute to fairness).
They do not follow Brezis’ prescription of utilising reviewer disagreement to
mark proposals for random selection, nor Graves et al.’s proposal of triage,
though the pre-filtering for transformative research may be seen as providing
this function. They also do not follow Gillies’ more extreme version of concern
regarding “research narcissism”, as they require both institutional affiliation
and passing a pre-filtering panel, which leaves space for bias to sneak back in,
though the interdisciplinary makeup of the panel may correct for this bias to
some extent. The Experiment! program is explicitly described as a pilot, and is
run alongside panel selection, which matches with the general observation that
evidence on funding selection is lacking, and more data is required to compare
between alternative mechanisms. Another data gathering exercise is being run
alongside the Explorer Grants program [6]. For all three streams, it is too early
to tell whether they had the kinds of effects that the academic arguments for
lottery suggest, but preliminary results are expected in the next few years; more
comprehensive comparisons, however, may require much longer, as the value
of some research projects is only revealed long after publication, in the case of
so-called “sleeping beauty” papers [33].
7. A note on impact
How did we get from the world of 1998, that had one Lancet article on funding
by lottery, to the world of 2017, with three funding streams implementing (some
version of) that policy? The full story will need to be uncovered by historians or
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sociologists of science policy, but it is helpful to track the way these arguments
have related to each other in the literature.
While concerns about various shortcomings of grant peer review have existed
for decades, there has been little systematic evaluation of the process [27].
Given this background, integrative interdisciplinary reviews of alternatives to
peer review have had a significant role to play in shaping alternative policies.
Ioannidis [32], published in the interdisciplinary journal Nature, presents a harsh
criticism of current funding practices, and surveys a range of possible measures
for improvement, including funding by lottery (citing Graves et al.’s work on
the randomness in current selection methods). Guthrie et al. [28] presents a
comprehensive policy-oriented survey of the literature on alternatives to grant
peer review. The report was produced by RAND Europe, a think tank often
contracted by governments and large funders with a long history of informing
policy decisions. In the section of funding by lottery, the report references
Ioannidis’s review, as well as Graves et al.’s results and Brezis’s model. This
RAND Europe report was cited by a New Zealand government review of the
Health Research Council’s Explorer Grants program [30].
The full citation graph for the works discussed in this paper is presented in
Fig. 2.14 Without drawing too many conclusions from a very limited sample
size, it seems that philosophy of science could be doing better in engaging the
audiences that are relevant for increasing the allocation of resources to scientific
novelty.
8. Conclusion
The world in 2018 contains three research funding streams that allocate funds
randomly amongst qualifying proposals. Though their total funding amount is
negligible when compared to the global basic R&D funding budget, the near-total
14Where authors have published more than once on the topic of funding by lottery I have
picked the earliest publication. Later publications (including this one) show more citations
across disciplines, including from non-philosophy papers to philosophy of science papers on
this topic, though there are yet no citation paths from policy reports such as HRC [30] to
works in philosophy of science.
34
Greenberg (1998)
Graves et al (2011) Ioannidis (2011)
Brezis (2007)
Gillies (2014)Avin (2015)Guthrie et al (2013)
HRC (2014) Fang and Casadevall (2016)
Figure 2: Partial citation graph for works discussing science funding by random allocation.
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dominance of funding by peer review as the gold standard of science funding
since World War Two mark these policies as surprising changes to the landscape.
This surprise is also partly attributable to the non-intuitive idea of funding by
lottery, despite arguments being put forward to attempt such policies starting two
decades ago. Looking at all the different arguments for randomised funding as a
whole, we can see a common structure emerging that emphasises the faults and
biases in peer review as a failure to accurately measure (or predict) future research
quality, in particular when evaluating novel research. Given this argument, a
novel mechanism is proposed – randomisation of selection post initial filtering
– that either cuts superfluous investment in useless evaluation (the cost saving
argument for lottery) or eliminates harmful bias in selection (the pro-novelty
and pro-diversity argument for lottery). While disagreements remain between
versions of the argument, and enough uncertainties remain to support different
specific implementations, it seems justifiable to run these policies as trial versions
to learn more about the outcomes. This is now happening, and provides an
opportunity for engagement for social epistemologists, for philosophers interested
in contributing to good policy, and for the (highly valuable, from a researcher
narcissism perspective) intersection of these two groups.
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